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Reviewing Associational Freedom Claims in
a Limited Public Forum: An Extension of the
Distinction Between Debate-Dampening and
Debate-Distorting State Action
by ALAN BROWNSTEIN* AND VIKRAM AMAR**
I. Background of the Case and the
Court's Essential Reasoning
The lawsuit that resulted in the Supreme Court opinion in
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez' originated when the Hastings
College of the Law ("Hastings") in San Francisco (a public law school
that is separate from, but affiliated with, the University of California
system) declined to grant official recognition as a Registered Student
Organization ("RSO") to the Hastings chapter of the Christian Legal
Society ("CLS"), a national network of lawyers and law students
devoted to upholding Christian ideals.
Hastings has a policy that, as written, requires all student groups
seeking RSO status (a status that brings with it various benefits,
including an opportunity for a small amount of monetary resources
and the use of certain bulletin boards and email distribution channels)
to agree to refrain from discriminating in accepting voting members
and choosing officers "on the basis of [among other things] religion
[and] sexual orientation."'
* Professor of Law, Boochever and Bird Chair for the Study and Teaching of
Freedom and Equality, University of California, Davis; B.A., Antioch College 1969; J.D.,
Harvard 1977.
** Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of
California, Davis; B.A., University of California, Berkeley 1985; J.D., Yale 1988.
Professor Amar was a tenured member of the Hastings College of the Law faculty when
this lawsuit arose, and he assisted in early stages of the litigation defense.
1. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
2. Id. at 2979.
[505]
The policy was later explained by Hastings in the litigation to
prohibit discrimination based on ideology as well, so that, in essence,
officially recognized student groups must accept all comers. Hence,
the policy became known as the "all-comers policy." As Hastings put
it, the policy requires that RSOs must "allow any student to
participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the
organization, regardless of [his or her] status or beliefs."'
CLS members at Hastings maintained that, despite this policy,
they had a First Amendment right to receive RSO recognition and
support, yet also to exclude non-Christians and practicing gays. The
lower courts ruled in favor of Hastings. The Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court decision by a five-four vote, with swing vote Justice
Anthony Kennedy joining the more "liberal" wing of the Court.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the majority opinion.
CLS argued two main points, both of them ultimately
unsuccessful. First, CLS maintained that it had a right to exclude
students, and still receive official recognition, because the inclusion of
people whom CLS considered to be nonbelievers would impair CLS's
ability to convey its message. Put in its most basic terms, this
argument suggested that CLS's inclusion of persons who had a vision
of Christianity or the role of sexual conduct within it different from
CLS's stance would undermine the viewpoint that CLS attempts to
promote. Second, CLS argued that Hastings's policy in effect
discriminated against religious groups on the basis of their viewpoint,
since religious groups tended to be the ones most likely to run afoul
of the policy.! The Court dispensed with both of CLS's arguments by
applying a single line of cases and a single judicially crafted test.
Because, wrote Justice Ginsburg, the relevant standard
governing so-called "limited public forums"-as established by past
Supreme Court cases-requires only that a government policy be
"reasonable" and not overtly viewpoint-targeted, the law school's
program passed constitutional muster.' As the Court pointed out, the
3. Id.
4. See Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v.
Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL 997217 (N.D. Cal. Apr 17, 2006); Christian Legal
Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx 645 (9th
Cir. 2009).
5. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2971.
6. Id. at 2992.
7. Id. at 2994.
8. Id. at 2991-94.
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First Amendment framework erected by these past cases
distinguishes between (1) "traditional" public forums (e.g., streets
and parks); (2) "designated" public forums (which are not streets or
parks, but are areas that the government has affirmatively opened up
generally for expressive purposes, and that are therefore treated like
traditional public forums); and (3) "limited" public forums, which are
forums created for, and limited to, specific expressive purposes and
speakers.
Applying the more lenient test governing "limited public
forums," the Court found the Hastings policy to be reasonable
because it advanced, at least to some nontrivial extent, Hastings's
goals in setting up the RSO program."o And the policy was not
viewpoint-based, the Court reasoned, because a "take all-comers"
requirement, on its face, does not target any group, but rather
requires all groups-regardless of their particular messages-to
accept persons who may not agree with the group's beliefs.n
H. What the Martinez Case Illustrates About Limited Public
Forum Doctrine in the University Context
What are we to make of this ruling? For starters, as in many
First Amendment cases, the constitutional framing of the issue was
crucial in resolving the case. The choice of the "reasonable" and
viewpoint-neutral test-that is, the choice of the appropriate
doctrinal box or category on the First Amendment case law
flowchart-essentially dictated the result. If a different box had been
chosen, a different (and more stringent) test would have applied, and
a different result might have resulted. To see that point clearly,
consider how the majority treated what CLS may have thought was
one of its most helpful past cases, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.12 In that case, the Court
unanimously upheld the First Amendment right of a veterans group
sponsoring a St. Patrick's Day parade to be exempt from a state law
prohibiting the exclusion of gay individuals who wanted to march in
the parade with a banner celebrating their Irish background and their
9. See id. at 2984, n. 11.
10. Id. at 2988-93.
11. Id. at 2993-95.
12. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557 (1995).
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sexual orientation. 13  In rejecting the relevance of Hurley, the
Martinez Court pointed out that "Hurley involved ... the most
traditional of public forums: the street. That context differs markedly
from the limited public forum at issue here," which is governed by a
"lesser standard of scrutiny . .. compared to other forums."l4 Indeed,
although the Court's discussion of the various categories of forum
analysis has not always been consistent-as recently as 2006, the
author of a prominent Constitutional Law treatise concluded that the
"test for limited public forums is the same as for [traditional] public
forums; so long as the government opens the place for speech, it must
meet the requirements for public forums""-it now appears clear that
the limited public forum box is one in which the government has a
much easier time justifying its regulations. Indeed, the review of
regulations restricting access to limited public forums is essentially
the same deferential review applied to regulations restricting speech
in nonpublic forums.
Was this choice of the limited public forum box inevitable? In
the CLS dispute, one (although perhaps not the only) sufficient
explanation of the Court's crucial invocation of the limited public
forum test is that CLS seemed to concede that test's applicability at
oral argument. Justice Ginsburg said this on behalf of the majority,
citing to statements by the lawyers on both sides, "[T]he parties agree
that Hastings, through its RSO program, established a limited public
forum.""
It is possible that CLS could have argued the case should be
viewed through the prism of a designated public forum. A designated
public forum is a generally available forum that the government
creates for all speakers on all topics, and is treated like a traditional
public forum as long as the designation remains in place. An example
of a designated public forum might be the forum created by a public
college's decision to permit all students to engage in whatever non-
violent, nondisruptive expressive and associational activities they
choose, on a particular lawn or quad on campus. Had CLS been able
to characterize Hastings's RSO program as creating a designated
public forum-one that was essentially created for the purpose of
hosting unfettered and unstructured expression and association by
13. Id.
14. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2989, n. 17.
15. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1138
(3d ed. 2006).
16. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984, n. 12.
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students-CLS could have tapped into a higher level of judicial
scrutiny.
The designated-public forum label might have been plausible
because Hastings does not seem to limit the subject matter around
which any RSO chooses to organize. Organizations may be formed
and recognized "to pursue academic and social interests" and to
further "education and [help] develop leadership skills." Pursuing all
"academic" and "social" interests is an objective that seems quite
capacious. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's separate writing in the case
says that the Hastings policy operates "across a broad, seemingly
unlimited range of ideas, views and activities."" A Christian group, a
Democratic group, or even a Frisbee club or a co-ed fraternity-like
group could all qualify, so long as each was limited to students,
refrained from illegal activity, and took all comers.
That is to say, the fact that RSOs at Hastings do not have to
involve any particular connection to the law, or legal education, or
any other idea or set of ideas might have at least opened the door to a
characterization that Hastings simply wants groups to exist and
flourish for no specific purpose other than to express themselves.
And if it had been proven that Hastings had only this generalized
intent regarding its student groups, perhaps the groups, taken
together, would have looked more like a designated, than a limited,
public forum. But this avenue of argument and/or proof was
foreclosed by CLS's own use of the limited forum category.
Consider as well the other key stipulation that, according to the
majority at least, CLS made in the litigation: Hastings's policy really
does require a group to do more than refrain from racial or religious
or sexual-orientation discrimination because it requires a group to
take all comers, regardless of belief or ideology.'" Most importantly,
this stipulation seems to take much of the wind out of CLS's claim
that the policy is viewpoint discriminatory. According to the
stipulation, the policy does not single out religion as the one kind of
ideology that cannot be used to exclude RSO members and leaders.
By its very nature, the "take all-comers policy" is not focused on
religion or any other particular ideological basis of potential
exclusion. Instead, the policy deals equally with all exclusionary
actions, regardless of their ideological motivation. In light of these
stipulated features of the policy, the Court indicated, it would be hard
17. Id. at 2999 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 2981 (majority opinion).
to claim that Hastings harbored or implemented hostility to any
particular ideology when it adopted the policy."9
Even without this concession-by-stipulation, CLS still might have
lost in its bid to characterize the Hastings policy as viewpoint-based,
either facially or in practice. As elaborated below in Part III, the
concept of viewpoint discrimination in this context is complicated.
But with the concession in place, CLS's argument about viewpoint
discrimination fell particularly flat to the Justices in the majority.
Finally, consider how truly deferential the Court was in applying
the limited public forum test to the facts of the Hastings case. Even
under non-strict "limited" public forum scrutiny, the Hastings policy
still had to be reasonable. But given its open-endedness, what
purposes does the RSO policy really serve? Does a policy that allows
any group, formed around any set of ideas or activities, to exist-but
also requires each such group to take all persons, even those who may
vehemently disagree with those ideas or activities-make much
sense? What, precisely, does a policy that requires the Federalist
Society (a conservative organization) to accept people who believe
not in Federalist Society principles, but rather in the precepts of the
American Constitution Society (a liberal organization), accomplish?
The Court does not say very much about the plausibility of Hastings's
policy.
To be sure, the Court downplays the fear that had been
expressed by CLS that allowing persons who disagree with a group to
join and run it permits the hijacking of the group. 20 But even if such
fears of hijacking are exaggerated, the majority opinion never really
explains why Hastings's policy permits the possibility of hijacking to
exist at all.
Another way of putting the question is to ask why, for instance, a
Jewish student would want to join CLS if the student and other
prospective members deeply disagree about the virtues of
Christianity? This question is especially relevant for groups such as
CLS that are not "religion and" groups-that is, groups that seek to
promote both religion and a nonreligious activity, like the (fictitious)
Hindu Backpacking Club, or the (equally fictitious) Muslim Chess
Club. In those "religion and" instances, members may want to join
even if they disagree with some of the group's tenets. But that seems
less true for groups like the CLS. If there is a weakness to the
19. Id. at 2996.
20. Id. at 2992.
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majority opinion, it might be in defining precisely what goals Hastings
is reasonably advancing in setting up its RSO policy the way it has.
The majority says, in this regard, only that "extracurricular
programs are, today, essential parts of the educational process."2 1
Fair enough, but what do vague statements like this really mean in
the context of Hastings's RSO program, which is so broadly defined?
Justice Samuel Alito's dissent did identify one goal articulated by
the Hastings policy-to "promote a diversity of viewpoints among
registered student organizations."22 But this goal would seem to
argue in favor of organizational autonomy. For a diversity of
viewpoints among organizations to exist, each organization must
espouse one or more viewpoints, which means each must be free-if
this particular goal is to be furthered at all-to define its own
membership, based on distinctive beliefs and attitudes.
Now, perhaps Hastings's goal is to promote diversity not just
among organizations, but also within each organization, in order to
force students of different ideologies and points of views to confront
and deal with each other in a civilized way. Justice Kennedy's
separate writing hints at this intra-organizational diversity objective,
but it might have been useful for this idea to have been fleshed out
more fully. The majority could have documented this objective more
persuasively by giving examples of what Hastings actually said it is
trying to promote, as shown in the record of its policy and in this
litigation. When expressive activity is directly regulated, even the
application of a mere reasonableness test under the First Amendment
should perhaps require courts to look carefully at what the
government was actually trying to accomplish. Until the specific,
actual objective is isolated, it is impossible to make a judgment as to
whether that objective is reasonably advanced.
Even if it were shown that this kind of intra-organizational
diversity was Hastings's objective, there would still be a question of
the effectiveness of forcing students with significant disagreements
into a single group in order to foster this goal. Opposing students
would grapple and learn from each other, but they might also splinter
off and form another group-until that group, too, is forced to admit
students with whom they disagree. Unlike classrooms, where
21. Id. at 2989.
22. Id. at 3013 (Alito, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 2999 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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students must be present if they are to receive their educations,
membership in any student organization is completely voluntary.
One possibility is that the limited public forum test is always to
be applied deferentially; a government entity's rationale for limiting
the forum is to be inferred from the contours of the limits to the
forum itself, and so long as a court can hypothesize a plausible,
legitimate governmental goal to which the limitation is minimally
rationally related, the government's position will be upheld.
Certainly, the test is deferential if regulating what the Court calls
limited public forums today is reviewed under the same test
historically used for nonpublic forums.24
Another possibility is that special deference applies in
constitutional cases against universities. The Martinez majority itself
suggested that "in various contexts [judges must] resist 'substitut[ing]
their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school
authorities which they review."'25 Granted, in the same breath, the
Court does say that it owes "no deference" to universities in deciding
the meaning of the First Amendment,26 but it seems that resisting an
impulse to substitute one's own notions for someone else's is precisely
what deference requires.
In this regard, the Martinez case is reminiscent of Grutter v.
Bollinger 27 the case upholding race-based affirmative action at the
University of Michigan, seven years ago. There, too, the Court
tried-and, again, not entirely successfully-to straddle a line
between respect for law-school policies and commitment to
independent judicial decision-making. And there, the Court
disclaimed deference to the University, but nevertheless did not seem
to apply strict scrutiny with the same keen skepticism it has employed
in other cases.
Technically, perhaps, as a logical matter, one could defer to
Hastings on the question of "sound educational policy," yet still
decide the legal First Amendment question of whether there is a
constitutional violation de novo (that is, on a clean slate, without any
deference at all to the school). But when the test under the First
Amendment that the Supreme Court has crafted asks whether a
policy is "reasonable," deferring to the educational institution on
24. For a lenient application of the nonpublic forum test, see Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
25. Martinez, 130 U.S. at 2988.
26. Id. at 2988.
27. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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what makes for "sound" education seems awfully close to deferring to
the university on the ultimate constitutional question; "sound" and
"reasonable" are very close, if not identical, concepts.
Let us be clear: We are not arguing that deference to universities
is necessarily wrong. Our only suggestion here is that we should
appreciate that such deference may be doing the real work in many
high-profile cases involving speech, equality, and related issues arising
in the university setting. And if that is the case, this subterranean
factor ought to be brought into the light of day, and acknowledged
more directly in the Court's opinions.
III. The Special Case of Associational Autonomy in a
Limited Public Forum
In one important respect, the Court in Martinez confronted a
constitutional issue of first impression: How should the Court
evaluate a burden on a group's freedom of association, rather than
the group's freedom of speech, in a limited public forum? Through a
long line of cases, the Court has struggled to develop a framework for
evaluating restrictions that control access to a limited public forum in
the context of pure speech." As noted earlier, if the speech
regulation is viewpoint discriminatory, it will be reviewed under strict
scrutiny. 29 If the regulation is content-discriminatory or content-
neutral, the Court generally says it will be upheld as long as it is
reasonable, a fairly lenient standard of review.30
Yet this nuanced framework had never before been recognized
to apply to freedom of association cases involving limited public
forums where the regulation at issue is directed not at what the
association says, but rather at its membership policies and
procedures. All the Court's earlier freedom of association cases
evaluating regulations directed at or burdening the ability to associate
or maintain associational autonomy focused on associations operating
on private property or in traditional public forums." The Court
rigorously reviewed restrictions on associational freedom in these
28. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992);
Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
29. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30
(1995).
30. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
31. See, e.g. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
circumstances and locations." It had never before, however,
addressed the question of how freedom of association claims should
be evaluated when a group's membership decisions are the basis for
denying it access to a limited public forum.
The Court's answer to this novel question in Martinez makes
three points. First, the Court explained that in important ways,
freedom of speech and freedom of association claims merge
together." Who people associate with, after all, will influence what
those associated individuals will say. Second, the Court concluded
the considerations that justify more lenient review of regulations of
speech in a limited public forum, as opposed to a traditional public
forum or private property, apply with equal force to regulations
restricting associational freedom in a limited public forum.m Finally,
the Court assumed with little supportive analysis that the same
varying standards of review that apply to speech regulations in a
limited public forum should apply to regulations of association as
well.3 1 Viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions will receive strict
scrutiny. 6 Content-discriminatory and content-neutral regulations
will be evaluated under a low level reasonableness standard of
review. 37  Accordingly, because the Hastings "all-comers" policy
applied to all student groups seeking to become a RSO at Hastings
without regard to the group's viewpoint, the Hastings policy should
be upheld as long as it is reasonable." After lengthy discussion, the
Court held that the policy satisfied this relatively modest standard of
review.39
While the Court's first two premises may be challenged on the
grounds that freedom of association rights are distinct from free
speech rights and should receive independent protection,4 we accept
these positions arguendo as adequately defended, at least for the
32. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984-85 ("[Tlhis Court has rigorously reviewed laws and
regulations that constrain associational freedom.").
33. Id. at 2985.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2986.
36. Id. at 2984, 2988.
37. Id. at 2988.
3& Id. at 2993-94.
39. Id. at 2988-93.
40. While we take no position on this issue, Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat forcefully
challenges the Court's merging of freedom of association and free speech rights in his
article in this symposium issue.
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purpose of this article. The third premise, however, is more
problematic and requires additional explanation. Why exactly does
the Court think that the way it has defined speech regulations and the
distinctions it has drawn between viewpoint-discriminatory, content-
discriminatory, and content-neutral speech regulations should apply
without change or modification to the regulation of an association's
membership criteria? Is the analogy strong enough between the
nature of speech regulations and the nature of association regulations
to justify applying speech regulation categories to freedom of
association claims? The Court clearly thinks that it is. However, the
Court does very little to explain why it thinks so or to justify this
conclusion."
Indeed, if the Court is going to borrow the free speech
framework for limited public forums and make it applicable to
freedom of association regulations, it would be helpful if the Court
explicitly categorized the nature of the Hastings regulation at issue in
this case. Obviously, the Court does not think the regulation is
viewpoint discriminatory. But is it content discriminatory or content
neutral? In her discussion of the allegedly discriminatory effects of
the Hastings policy, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, seems
to suggest that the policy can be analogized to a content-neutral
speech regulation. 42  As such, the fact that it incidentally burdens
some speakers or messages more than others would not undermine its
constitutionality.43
We are not fully persuaded by this suggestion, however. Suppose
Hastings adopted a regulation prohibiting any RSO that published a
periodical from discriminating against any article submitted for
publication on the basis of the social, political, or religious beliefs
expressed in its text. Essentially this would be an "all-beliefs"
publication requirement that was intended to parallel the all-comers
41. The Court does argue that because the state has the power to draw distinctions
and restrict the scope of a limited public forum for free speech purposes, it would be
anomalous to prohibit it from exercising the same discretion under freedom of association
requirements. Id. at 2985-86. That contention is accurate, but it presumes the answer to
the question that it is trying to resolve. The open issue is what kind of restriction on
freedom of association is comparable to and deserves to be subject to the same standard of
review as content-neutral, content-discriminatory, or viewpoint-discriminatory speech
regulations.
42. Id. at 2994 (explaining that the Court is satisfied that the Hastings "all-comers"
policy "is justified without reference to the content [or viewpoint] of the regulated
speech") (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (internal
quotations omitted).
43. Id. at 2994.
membership requirement. While this speech regulation might be
considered to be viewpoint neutral because it applies with equal force
to all publications and all beliefs, we would certainly think it is a
content-discriminatory rather than a content-neutral regulation.
From this perspective, the Hastings "all-comers" policy might be
more accurately analogized to a content-discriminatory regulation
rather than a viewpoint-discriminatory regulation.
That conclusion would not require a change in the Court's
holding in Martinez. Content-discriminatory regulations along with
content-neutral regulations in a limited public forum will still be
upheld if they are reasonable. Our point is not simply that the Court
may have been mistaken in analogizing the Hastings policy to a
content-neutral speech regulation; it is that the transposition of the
free speech doctrinal framework for reviewing speech regulations in a
limited public forum to freedom of association cases is awkward and
uncertain. More than quick and assumed analogies are necessary if
the Court is going to persuasively justify its conclusions.
A. Looking Behind the Categories: Distinguishing Between Debate
Distorting and Debate Dampening Regulations
A more in-depth analysis would look to the purposes of the
Court's free speech distinctions as opposed to presumptively adopting
the categories themselves. If we move behind the conventional
categories of speech regulation to identify the constitutional concerns
that support the distinction between viewpoint-discriminatory,
content-discriminatory and content-neutral laws, an extension of
doctrine from freedom of speech to freedom of association can be
explained more thoroughly and precisely. There are two related
problems with viewpoint-discriminatory regulations. First, they
distort debate in a way that games the system (here, the marketplace
of ideas) to achieve a preordained goal: The rejection of one
perspective in favor of the opposing point of view.' Second, it is hard
to identify a state interest furthered by such regulations other than
those that are derivative of one side of a debate being silenced or
hampered. Thus, the state may have an interest in prohibiting bad
44. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Regulations, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46,
55 (1987) [hereinafter Content- Neutral Restrictions]; Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of
Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI.
L. REv., 81, 101 (1978) [hereinafter Subject-Matter Restrictions]; Alan E. Brownstein,
Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and
Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 553, 590-91 (1996)
[hereinafter Rules of Engagement].
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speech because the speech will influence people to do bad things, but
the utility of this kind of regulation is that it suppresses speech that
the state believes is too dangerous to be communicated to the public.
Because individuals and the community cannot be trusted to evaluate
the competitive value of ideas, bad speech must be silenced.
Content-discriminatory and content-neutral regulations differ
from viewpoint discrimination in both of these respects. These
regulations limit the scope of debate and may make it more difficult
for speakers to communicate their message to their intended
audience, but they do not have the same propensity to distort debate.
The burden on speech created by viewpoint-neutral regulations will,
at least formally, fall in a more evenhanded way on competing
speakers and ideas. Thus, a content-discriminatory ban on political
speech prohibits both liberal and conservative messages, and a ban on
leafleting restricts that manner of speech regardless of the message
being communicated.4 5 Moreover, there are often neutral, non-
distorting and legitimate justifications for these kinds of regulations.
Particularly in a limited public forum, the government may have a
legitimate reason for restricting the subject matter of speech in order
to focus the discussion on a topic of interest or value. Indeed, as the
Court explained in Martinez, the legitimacy of such subject matter
constraints underlies the very idea of a limited public forum, which by
definition is open to some speakers and not others.46 Of course,
content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations are recognized to
serve neutral and legitimate purposes such as noise control, order,
tranquility, and residential privacy.47
This does not mean that content-discriminatory and content-
neutral regulations will never have disparate impacts on speakers or
viewpoints. They often do.48 Nor does it suggest that the dampening
45. See, e.g., Subject-Matter Restrictions, supra note 44, at 83; Martin Redish, The
Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 139 (1981); Rules
of Engagement, supra note 44, at 591-92.
46. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985-86.
47. See, e.g., Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 44, at 74-76; Rules of
Engagement, supra note 44, at 610-11.
48. See, e.g., Subject-Matter Restrictions, supra note 44, at 110; Rules for Engagement,
supra note 44, at 592-96; Cass R. Sunstein, Half Truths of the First Amendment, 1993 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 42 (1993). For examples of the propensity of content-discriminatory
regulations to have viewpoint-discriminatory consequences, see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666 (1998); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), a case upholding a statutory
speech restricting buffer zone around medical clinics, is a strong example of a formally
content-neutral speech regulation having predictable viewpoint-discriminatory results.
of debate resulting from such regulations imposes only limited
burdens on speech. Viewpoint-neutral regulations can still
substantially reduce speech opportunities. 49  They can make it
extremely difficult to communicate messages to an intended audience.
Notwithstanding these consequences, the Court has concluded that at
least in a limited public forum, there is a free speech line requiring
different standards of review between regulations that intrinsically
distort debate and those that formally dampen debate or make speech
more difficult (although they may have debate distorting
consequences).
This distinction between regulations that distort debate and
those that dampen debate can provide an analytic framework for
evaluating state policies that restrict associational freedom in a
limited public forum. The key question in cases like Martinez would
be whether the regulation at issue reduces opportunities for debate or
makes speech more difficult, or whether it distorts debate in a way
that guarantees victory to one viewpoint over another. Here, there
can be little doubt that controlling access to a limited public forum by
regulating the criteria that groups may employ in choosing their
members and leaders will make admission to that forum far less
valuable to expressive groups than a policy that permitted groups to
exercise greater freedom in selecting their members. The all-comers
policy adopted by Hastings not only creates some marginal risk of a
hostile takeover by those who oppose the group's ostensible
purpose,so it also substantially increases the transaction costs that
groups will incur in trying to express a message. The burden of
having to continually deal with dissenters is time consuming,
distracting, and debilitating. Justice Kennedy identifies but
understates these costs when he states in his concurrence that, "the
all-comers policy ... [may make it more] difficult for certain groups
to express their views in a manner essential to their message."
49. For example, the viewpoint-neutral restrictions on speech within 100 feet of the
entrance to a health care facility upheld in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), made it
more difficult for anti-abortion protestors to speak to women visiting clinics to obtain
abortions. Similarly, the prohibition against posting signs on utility poles upheld in Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), limited the opportunities available
to groups with little financial backing for communicating their message to the general
public.
50. The dissenting Justices view this possibility as substantial. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct
at 3019 (Alito, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2999 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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These costs, however, are spread across all advocacy groups at
Hastings. Indeed, they also apply to nonadvocacy groups that need a
unified commitment from their members to achieve their goals. The
"all-comers" policy disadvantages all expressive associations in
essentially the same way. There is no convincing argument that it
directly distorts debate in a way that disfavors some ideas or the
groups that espouse them more than others. Even Justice Alito
essentially concedes that the "all-comers" policy is formally neutral
by focusing his dissent on the contention that the policy was adopted
as a pretext in order to further a discriminatory purpose.52 Justice
Alito assigned only one footnote to the argument that the "all-
comers" policy was viewpoint discriminatory.13
Of course, one may argue that in fact the all-comers policy will
have more of an incidental impact on certain groups expressing
certain messages than others. That may turn out to be the case. But
that is also true for many content-discriminatory and content-neutral
laws that are routinely subjected to lenient review notwithstanding
their incidental, albeit highly predictable, viewpoint-discriminatory
consequences. If we are going to use the limited public forum free
speech template as the basis for evaluating freedom of association
cases, the Court's analysis should be grounded on the free speech
precedent in this area. Thus, the question to be answered would be
whether the Hastings "all-comers" policy has more of a debate-
distorting effect than the content-discriminatory and content-neutral
policies and regulations governing limited public forums that the
Court has upheld under a deferential standard of review. That case
law suggests that few incidental viewpoint-discriminatory
consequences-no matter how predictable or substantial they may
52. Id. at 3016-19 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito does not cite any free speech
cases to support his assertion that an otherwise constitutional, facially neutral law would
be struck down as unconstitutional if plaintiffs demonstrate that the law was actually
intended to further the discriminatory purpose of burdening a particular viewpoint or
message. In fact, the case law suggests exactly the contrary. For First Amendment
purposes, proof of discriminatory purpose will not justify subjecting a formally neutral law
to the rigorous review reserved for facially discriminatory legislation. See United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (rejecting the argument that the actual purpose of the
law prohibiting draft card burning was to suppress speech because "[i]t is a familiar
principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive"); Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558-59 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (rejecting any attempt to evaluate laws under the First Amendment based on
the motives or purposes of the legislature in adopting the law).
53. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3016 n. 10 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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be-should be able to convince the Court that heightened review is
appropriate for formally neutral associational restrictions in a limited
public forum.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has been remarkably sanguine about
upholding content-discriminatory and content-neutral speech
regulations in a limited public forum or nonpublic forum,54 even when
the viewpoint-discriminatory implications of the regulations are
difficult to ignore. In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators' Association," for example, PLEA, a union competing with
PEA-the union recognized as the collective bargaining
representative of a school district's teachers-sought access to the
school district's interschool mailboxes and delivery system. The
interschool mail delivery system was open to teachers and
administrators for personal and business messages, to various outside
organizations such as church groups, the Cub Scouts and the YMCA,
and, most importantly, to the union currently representing the
teachers in the school district."
The Court concluded that the exclusion of the rival union was
based on its status, not its viewpoint, and upheld the school district's
decision to deny access to PLEA. PLEA had not been recognized as
the collective bargaining agent of the teachers. PEA-the union
which was permitted access to the interschool mail system-had been
certified as the teachers' bargaining agent. As long as this status
discrimination was reasonable, it would be upheld against a First
Amendment challenge.
54. As discussed supra, there is little difference between a nonpublic forum and a
limited public forum under the Court's free speech jurisprudence. In theory, speech
regulations falling within the parameters of a limited public forum receive rigorous review
while the parameters of a limited public forum itself are evaluated under the same lenient
standard of review applied to speech regulations in a nonpublic forum. In practice,
however, a court is relatively free to construe any challenged speech regulation as the
latter rather the former and, accordingly, to apply a lenient standard of review.
55. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
56. Id. at 40.
57. The Court in Perry rejected PLEA's argument that the District had created a
limited public forum in its inter-school mail delivery system. Id. at 47. But it also
explained that it would apply the same standard of review and reach the same result if it
determined that the District had created a limited public forum. PLEA would not fall
within the parameters of a limited public forum allegedly created by the District when it
permitted groups like the Cub Scouts to use the system or when it had permitted both
unions to use the system prior to PEA being designated the collective bargaining agent of
the teachers. Id. at 48. As noted earlier, decisions like Perry render the distinction
between limited public forums and nonpublic forums all but useless to a litigant
challenging a speech restriction. There is no clear way to demonstrate that a challenged
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As a technical matter, the Court may be correct that the school
district's policy should be described as status discrimination. But in
practical terms, there can be little doubt that the policy distorts
debate. The existing bargaining agent is given a concrete advantage
in distributing messages to its constituency. The rival union is denied
that opportunity. Given the considerable likelihood that the two
unions disagree on substantive matters and on the quality of the
representation teachers are receiving from their recognized
bargaining representative, the policy advantages one speaker by
denying access to the forum to its critic.
In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes," the
Court also upheld a discriminatory speech policy notwithstanding its
blatant speech-distorting consequences. At issue was the decision of
a state owned public television station to exclude an independent
candidate "with little popular support" from a televised debate
among the candidates for a local congressional seat.5 9  After
characterizing the debate as a nonpublic forum, the Court concluded
that the exclusion of the third-party candidate was a viewpoint-
neutral policy decision that served the legitimate purpose of
promoting the primary purpose of the debate-the provision of an
orderly opportunity for the public to evaluate and compare the
positions of the viable candidates for office.'
Whatever the goals of the public television station may have
been, and however much the station's decision may have contributed
to a meaningful dialogue between the major candidates, there is little
doubt that the exclusion of a third-party candidate distorted the
debate. No one in a debate between the candidates of the two major
parties is going to raise the question of whether those parties have
failed to advance the public interest or the need for a candidate
outside of the mainstream parties' organizations to challenge current
political orthodoxy. That voice has been eliminated from the
discussion. The television station in Forbes may not have acted for
the purpose of silencing this perspective, but its decision undeniably
had such an effect.
regulation discriminates within a limited public forum as opposed to establishing the
limited public forum's parameters-which will be evaluated as a speech regulation
governing a nonpublic forum.
58. 523 U.S. 666
59. Id. at 669.
60. Id. at 680-83.
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Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.61
raises different issues from Perry and Forbes, but is also a case in
which the Court upheld a speech regulation with disturbing debate-
distorting implications in a nonpublic forum. At issue was an
Executive Order6 1 that barred legal defense and advocacy groups
from participating in the Combined Federal Campaign, the federal
government's workplace charity drive. Applying a reasonableness
analysis to what it described as a content-discriminatory but
viewpoint-neutral regulation, the Court explained that it may be
permissible to exclude controversial groups from a nonpublic forum
on the grounds that their presence might be disruptive and might
limit the effectiveness of the forum.63
Again, whatever the merits of the Court's analysis, it is clear that
the exclusion of controversial groups or speakers risks debate-
distorting consequences. Almost by definition, controversial groups
and speakers represent voices that challenge the status quo or offer
unpopular solutions to public policy problems. Accepted orthodoxy
and conventional mainstream perspectives are much less likely to be
characterized as controversial. By accepting the elimination of
controversial participants as a reasonable basis for limiting access to a
nonpublic forum, the Court does not dampen debate generally. It
upholds policies that distort debate by excluding more radical
messages and ideas from a forum.
Finally, in City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent," the Court
upheld a municipal ordinance that prohibited the posting of signs on
utility poles to further the City of Los Angeles's aesthetic interests.
Although the Court did not identify the nature of the forum at issue
in the case with precision, its frequent references to Perry suggest that
it recognized the poles to be a nonpublic forum. While the
challenged ordinance was neutral in form, it had a predictably
disproportionate impact on some speakers as opposed to others.
Signs on utility poles are an inexpensive medium used by those who
lack the resources to purchase more costly means of communication
such as radio, television, or newspaper advertisements. The Court
noted this reality in a footnote when it suggested that it "has shown
61. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1984).
62. Id. at 794-95.
63. Id. at 809-10.
64. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1983).
65. Id. at 814-15.
522 [Vol. 38:3
Spring 20111 ASSOCIATIONAL CLAIMS IN A LIMITED-PUBLIC FORUM 523
special solicitude for forms of expression that are much less expensive
than feasible alternatives and hence may be important to a large
segment of the citizenry,"' but it did not discuss the ordinance's
disparate impact any further, other than to note that the Court's
solicitude had limits. 7 To the extent that poorer groups may have
distinctly different perspectives on some issues than their wealthier
counterparts, it may be argued that Taxpayers for Vincent has debate-
distorting as well as debate-dampening consequences.
Given the case law described above, CLS's argument that the
Hastings policy is unconstitutional because it impacts some
associations more than others runs counter to a line of authority in
which the Court has consistently rejected such arguments. Indeed,
the Court's decision in Cornelius presents a particularly difficult
obstacle for CLS to overcome. Those groups which will be most
burdened by the Hastings all-comers anti-discrimination policy will be
advocacy groups who want to limit membership to those students who
support the organization's cause, ideology, or religion. But the Court
in Cornelius held that excluding all advocacy groups from a forum is a
viewpoint-neutral policy subject to relatively lenient reasonableness
review. If excluding all advocacy groups does not distort debate
enough to warrant rigorous review, it is hard to understand why anti-
discrimination requirements that burden the ability of advocacy
groups to achieve their goals should be strictly scrutinized.
If, in light of this case law, the Hastings policy is properly
construed to be a debate dampening rather than a debate distorting
regulation in its form and operation, the argument for low-level
reasonableness review has considerable force and support. It is
irrelevant to argue, as Justice Alito does in his dissent, that the
application of an all-comers law generally applicable to expressive
associations operating in the private sector would violate the First
Amendment. Of course it would. But so would most content-
discriminatory laws that are upheld as reasonable in a limited public
forum or nonpublic forum. Outside of viewpoint-discriminatory and
debate-distorting regulations, restrictions on speech defining a limited
public forum are subject to much more lenient review. Pursuant to
66. Id. at 812 n. 30.
67. Id.
68. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797.
69. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3014 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Martinez, a similar analysis applies to debate-dampening burdens on
associational freedom.
Nor would the analysis change if it were presented as an
argument about unconstitutional conditions. It is true that student
organizations are being asked to waive their right to associational
freedom in choosing their members and leaders in order to obtain
access to the limited public form that Hastings has created. However,
that would also be true if Hastings enforced a content-discriminatory
policy limiting access to its limited public forum to those student
groups focusing their activities on the study of law. A student group
establishing a fan club for the San Francisco Giants would have to
waive their right to pursue their interest in discussing baseball in
order to gain access to the Hastings forum. The question in both
cases would be whether such a condition was a reasonable limit on
access to a limited public forum.
B. The Reasonableness of the "All-Comers" Policy
Once the Court concluded that a reasonableness standard of
review should be applied to the Hastings policy, the only remaining
question was whether the "all-comers" policy satisfied this
requirement. Many of the arguments here were relatively
straightforward. The alleged benefits of the policy were that it
promoted internal discussion and debate within groups, protected
dissenters within a group who wanted their views considered without
fearing expulsion, and guaranteed students whose fees subsidized
RSOs that they would be permitted to join any group their student
fees supported. The alleged costs were an increased risk that
minority organizations would be taken over by the majority and the
potentially high transaction costs RSOs must incur in having to deal
with dissention among their members.'o
1. The Problem of Distinguishing Belief Discrimination from Status
Discrimination
One other problem with a policy that allows student religious
groups to discriminate on the basis of belief-the policy that would be
constitutionally required under the analysis offered by CLS-
deserves particular attention, however. Throughout the litigation, in
its briefs and during oral argument, CLS maintained that it was only
asserting a constitutional right to exclude potential members because
70. See supra, notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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of their beliefs." Discrimination based on a person's status or other
characteristics, such as race or gender, CLS maintained, represented a
different case which was not before the Court and, accordingly,
should not influence the Court's decision regarding the Hastings
policy. In oral argument, for example, CLS attorney Michael
McConnell insisted that CLS challenged only the part of Hastings's
policy prohibiting discrimination based on belief, and that Hastings
would remain free to prohibit discrimination based on status, such as
a student's race, if the Court ruled in CLS's favor.72 Yet when asked
by Justice John Paul Stevens, "What if the belief is that African
Americans are inferior?"" McConnell did no more than reiterate his
position that a registered student group "can discriminate on the basis
of belief, but not on the basis of status."7 4 That distinction, however,
would presumably allow a student club to limit its membership to
only those African Americans who believe (and were willing to
proclaim) that African Americans are inferior to other racial groups.
The CLS position raises three questions. First, why exactly is a
freedom of association claim based on belief-discrimination different
in kind from one that is based on status-discrimination? There is
nothing in the Court's opinion in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,5 for
example, that suggests that the Boy Scouts' freedom of association
right to exclude individuals who engaged in homosexual conduct from
its membership or leadership should be evaluated under a different
standard of review than would be applied to the Scouts' decision to
exclude girls and women from its organization."
Second, it is not clear that a constitutional rule allowing
discrimination based on the belief in African-American or female
inferiority differs markedly, in its real world effects, from a rule
71. CLS maintains that it does not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, but
rather with regard to beliefs about the morality of extramarital sexual conduct. See, e.g.,
Brief for Petitioner at 5-7, 39, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010)
72. Mr. McConnell stated "The stipulation is that they may not exclude based on
status or beliefs. We have only challenged the beliefs, not status. Race, any other status
basis Hastings is able to enforce." Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Martinez, 130 S. Ct.
2971 (2010).
73. Id. at 10.
74. Id. Later in response to a question by Justice Breyer, McConnell reiterated that
"our view is that the status half of that [Hastings policy] is perfectly constitutional and the
belief half of that is not." Id. at 11.
75. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
76. While the Court frequently refers to the Scouts' contention that "homosexual
conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill," id. at 654, there is nothing in the
majority opinion that limits its scope exclusively to conduct discrimination.
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allowing racial discrimination based on the color of a person's skin or
gender discrimination based on a person's sex. A discriminatory
membership policy excluding women who believe that they are
entitled to serve as an officer of an association and a membership
policy prohibiting women from serving as an officer of an association
would both end up precluding a woman from becoming an officer of
the association.
Third, if the Court was to accept the CLS position and draw a
distinction between an association's protected and permissible belief-
discrimination and its proscribable status-discrimination, how would a
government entity, such as Hastings, be able to enforce a regulation
prohibiting the latter kind of discrimination without jeopardizing the
right to engage in the former kind of discrimination? Justice
Ginsburg asks in the Court's opinion, "If a hypothetical Male-
Superiority Club barred a female student from running for its
presidency, for example, how could the Law School tell whether the
group rejected her bid because of her sex or because, by seeking to
lead the club, she manifested a lack of belief in its fundamental
principles."77 We can understand why CLS would want to avoid
having to answer these questions because the offered responses may
implicate problematic consequences. But avoiding these issues may
have done little to persuade the Justices that these concerns could be
successfully resolved in the real world by the officials required to do
so if the Court ruled in CLS's favor.
2. The Problem of Cabining the Scope of Belief-Discrimination
The CLS position implicates other questions about its scope and
consequences. One may reasonably ask, for example, whether the
right to discriminate and exclude nonbelievers applies only to voting
members and officers, or whether it should apply to any and all
students interested in participating in a student group's programs.
We understand that CLS at Hastings welcomed everyone to
participate in its activities, so this issue is not directly applicable to the
Martinez case. A ruling in favor of CLS would not have needed to
determine whether its current welcoming approach is a discretionary
choice which student groups can make or decline to make, or whether
a university can require an open-door policy for participation in
events as a condition to registration as a student group.
77. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990.
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But a right to exclude individuals from becoming members of an
association because they hold unacceptable beliefs could reasonably
extend to placing exclusionary limits on attendance at an association's
programs as well. If we followed Justice Alito's analysis in his dissent
and asked whether off-campus religious congregations could exclude
nonbelievers from their services and programs, the answer would
almost certainly be in the affirmative, at least for privately funded
activities. Indeed, the logic of recent Supreme Court cases, such as
Dale and Hurley," make it hard to explain why a student group's
rights would be limited to excluding voting members. The practical
arguments for such an extension track the arguments for permitting
exclusionary membership policies. Attendance at an event by non-
believers-say, an event involving the showing of a film and a
discussion of its content-could arguably change the event and impair
its usefulness to the organization."9 The costs of the exclusionary
policy to those denied the opportunity to participate in student fee-
funded programs would increase significantly, however.
A final question is whether the same freedom of association
claims that CLS asserted in Martinez should apply to what might be
called "religion and" groups and activities. The campus groups at
issue in such situations are ones that are organized around both their
faith and some additional activity that is not intrinsically religious: a
Catholic chess club, or a Lutheran math club, or a Presbyterian
debating society. These kinds of generic clubs or societies are more
likely to be organized at a high school or college rather than a law
school, but it is not clear that the associational freedom principle
advanced by CLS would apply differently to these various
educational institutions.
The problem, of course, is that associational exclusivity in a
"religion and" setting acts not only as a shield to protect the religious
organization from interference, but also as a sword that may make it
impossible for members of minority faiths to participate in a wide
range of extracurricular activities. If extracurricular activities at a
78. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557 (1995).
79. In its brief, CLS describes the devastating consequences that would result "if
non-Christians could walk in and insist on taking a turn leading one of CLS's weekly
studies of the Bible." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 30. But surely, a cohort of
non-Christians attending the Bible study sessions and challenging every statement
expressed by the person leading the group would be equally disruptive to the purpose of
the meeting.
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public high school, for example, may limit their membership to the
dominant religions in the community, there may be far too few
students adhering to other faiths to develop alternative programs that
can match the activities available to the majority. In some ways, this
is the converse problem to the one that Justice Alito highlights in his
dissent. Justice Alito worries that under the "all-comers policy,"
students holding minority beliefs will never be able to effectively
organize an association to promote their own interests because their
associations will be inundated by students holding majoritarian views
who will wrest control of the association from the students who
created it.' A policy permitting unrestricted belief-discrimination,
however, risks leaving members of minority faiths excluded and
isolated from the range of extracurricular activities enjoyed by
students of more broadly based religions because the minorities lack
the numbers necessary to create comparable programs solely for their
own use.
CLS noted correctly in its brief that this issue was much more
pronounced in Dale than in this case, because, unlike the Boy Scouts,
CLS is an exclusively expressive association.8' But the problem
remains an open and troubling one nonetheless. Because the Court
in Dale failed to adequately explain how the relevant standard of
review was actually applied in that case, we have no basis for even
beginning to address this issue today. Because CLS argued that their
case did not raise this issue, a victory for CLS in Martinez would
probably have left this issue clouded and unresolved as well.
In Martinez, CLS attempted to define the issue before the Court
as narrowly as possible, and to describe the broad range of issues
implicated by a ruling in CLS's favor as different disputes that need
not be adjudicated in the present case. That strategy may have been
an error. The range of first amendment claims opened by a holding
protecting the associational freedom to discriminate in a limited
public forum without any meaningful discussion of how these
auxiliary claims might be resolved may have discouraged the Court
from ruling in CLS's favor. It may not have been enough to suggest
that status-discrimination, exclusion from events as well as
membership, and "religion and" exclusionary associations raise
different and presumably more difficult questions than the claim
80. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3019 (Alito, J., dissenting) (fearing that "[a] true accept all-
comers policy permits small unpopular groups to be taken over by students who wish to
change the views that the group expresses").
81. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 45.
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presented by CLS in Martinez. Perhaps some attention should have
been directed to explaining how the Court and public universities and
high schools could respond to these claims, and others that almost
surely would arise, if the Court declared prohibitions against belief-
discrimination by students groups to be unconstitutional.
IV. Was the Original Written Hastings Policy
Unconstitutional?
Justice Alito's dissenting opinion, building largely upon CLS's
brief, argued that the original Hastings policy codified in writing
constituted viewpoint discrimination prohibited by the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment." Both Justice Alito's dissent and the
CLS brief on which it appears to have been based have serious
analytic weaknesses. More importantly, both arguments are
dangerous to the cause of religious liberty and equality.
In its brief, CLS claimed that the written Hastings anti-
discrimination policy was viewpoint discriminatory in two respects.
First, CLS argued that in Hastings's list of bases on which
discrimination was forbidden, sexual orientation (which Hastings
interpreted to include sexual activity as well as sexual identity) "[was]
the only forbidden ground based on conduct."" All groups (other
than groups that have a problem with homosexuality) were
"permitted to insist that [their] leaders conduct themselves in
accordance with the group's stated beliefs."" Only groups opposed to
certain sexual activities that Hastings categorized as sexual
orientation were burdened by this policy. This, CLS insisted, was
viewpoint discrimination."
Justice Alito described this viewpoint-discrimination argument in
slightly different terms. CLS espoused the viewpoint that sexual
conduct outside marriage (defined in a particular way that was
consistent with its religious beliefs-here, between a man and a
woman) is wrongful.' Hastings's prohibition against discrimination
based on sexual orientation prevented CLS from discriminating
against sexually active gays and lesbians who did not view their sexual
relationships as wrongful. However, Justice Alito explained, a Free
82. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3010-12 (Alito, J., dissenting).
83. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 39.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 39-40.
86. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3012 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Love Club could reject as members students who support a
traditional view of marriage. Alito concluded that "[i]t is hard to see
how this can be viewed as anything other than viewpoint
discrimination.""
Both of these arguments have serious flaws. The argument CLS
expressed in its brief is simply wrong on the facts. Sexual orientation
is not the only forbidden ground that is based on conduct in
Hastings's written policy. Does anyone doubt that Hastings would
find that discrimination against interracial marriages, dating, or
friendships would fall under the prohibition of race discrimination in
its policy? But interracial relationships also involve conduct. CLS is
simply wrong when it says that anti-gay groups are the only ones that
must tolerate unwanted conduct of prospective members.
Indeed, religion itself has a conduct element and is not simply
about beliefs. One of us is Jewish. That means he holds certain
beliefs. But it also means he engages in certain conduct and activities.
He practices Judaism. Assume a registered nonreligious student
group at Hastings told a Jewish student, "Look, we are not
discriminating against you because of your beliefs. We are
discriminating against you because you do Jewish things-you
worship the way Jews worship." We have absolutely no doubt that
Hastings would find this conduct-based discrimination to be religious
discrimination and thus prohibited under its policy. Accordingly, we
see little in fact or law to support the argument that Hastings is
engaged in viewpoint discrimination because sexual orientation is
singled out and only groups that oppose gay conduct (as opposed to
any other kind of conduct) are distinctly regulated.
Justice Alito's argument is broader and even more troubling.
Taken to its logical conclusion, it would undermine the
constitutionality of any anti-discrimination principle protecting
individuals or groups defined by their conduct. Consider the
prohibition against anti-miscegenation exclusions mentioned above.
Suppose a student group will only allow interracial married couples to
be members of the association if they acknowledge the wrongfulness
of all interracial marital relationships including their own. If a public
university concludes that the student group's decision violates its
policy prohibiting racial discrimination, it would be held to have
engaged in prohibited viewpoint discrimination. Why? Because
other student groups would be permitted to reject a student seeking
87. Id.
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membership if he espoused the belief that interracial marriages were
immoral. In essence, anti-discrimination policies prohibiting the
exclusion of people engaged in interracial or inter-ethnic relationships
are viewpoint discriminatory unless they also prohibit discrimination
against racists and ethno-centric bigots. An anti-discrimination policy
protecting married students from discrimination would run afoul of a
similar analysis. If a student club would be barred from refusing to
admit married students unless they acknowledged the immorality of
their relationship, the university would be held to have engaged in
viewpoint discrimination unless it also barred discrimination against
those who believed that marriage is immoral.
The second variant of CLS's viewpoint-discrimination argument
is also problematic. CLS argued in its brief that among the list of
categories that Hastings protected against discrimination, religion was
"the only forbidden ground that is based on belief or opinion.""
According to CLS, this singling out of religious students for
protection from discrimination also constituted viewpoint bias. Why?
Because "of all the various opinion-based organizations at Hastings,
religious groups [were] the only ones stripped of their right to control
their message by controlling their leadership."8  Since the
''environmentalist club" could have discriminated against "climate
change skeptics," it was viewpoint discriminatory to prohibit CLS
from discriminating against non-Christians.9 Justice Alito echoed
this analysis and even used the same environmentalist club example
in his dissent.91
The authors of the CLS brief recognized, however, that there had
to be some limit to their contention that prohibiting religious
discrimination is viewpoint discrimination. After all, prohibiting
religious discrimination is generally thought to be a good thing for
universities to do, and a good thing for religious persons in general
and members of minority faiths in particular. In recognition of this
reality, the CLS brief stated that, "the prohibition on religious
discrimination is untroubling, indeed commendable, as applied to
governmental institutions, businesses, and even nonreligious clubs.
But when applied to groups that are organized around shared
religious beliefs, this prohibition is unfair, counterproductive,
88. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 36.
89. Id. at 37.
90. Id.
91. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3010 (Alito, J., dissenting).
disabling, and unconstitutional."' There was, tellingly, no citation to
authority to support this point in the CLS brief.
This argument simply won't work, and indeed, it ultimately
collapses upon itself. The constitutional prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination is not so easily cabined or limited. CLS
contended that it was viewpoint discrimination to treat student
organizations based on religious belief differently and less favorably
than student organizations based on secular beliefs. But if that is so,
why is it not equally viewpoint discriminatory to treat students who
hold and espouse secular beliefs less favorably than students who
hold religious beliefs. Freedom of expressive association, after all, is
derivative of freedom of speech and freedom of religion. 93
Under the policy that CLS appears to endorse, students who
hold secular beliefs would receive no protection against
discrimination by religious student groups under a permissible anti-
discrimination policy (religious student groups would be permitted to
discriminate against members of other faiths and those who reject all
religious beliefs). Yet religious students would be protected from
discrimination on the basis of their beliefs by secular student groups.
If religion is to be considered another viewpoint of speech, no
different than any other political, social, or cultural belief or message,
as CLS seems to argue, why would it ever be permissible to treat
persons who hold religious beliefs and express religious messages
differently and more favorably than other persons who hold and
express other political, social, or cultural beliefs or messages?
To put the point another way, if it is viewpoint discriminatory to
allow the environmentalist club to discriminate against climate
change skeptics, while prohibiting CLS from discriminating against
non-Christians, why is it not equally viewpoint-discriminatory to
allow CLS to discriminate against environmentalists (if it believes
that environmentalists' beliefs are inconsistent with its statement of
faith) while prohibiting the environmentalist club from discriminating
against Christians? Yet CLS seems to suggest that there is no
problem with a policy that prohibits non-religious clubs from
92. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 36-37.
93. Indeed, Justice Alito's dissent focuses on the freedom of speech dimension of this
case. What is most problematic about the Hastings policy to Alito is that it punishes
unpopular ideas. Of course, the Hastings policy is directed at the CLS membership policy,
but that is important because of its impact on a group's ability to communicate its
message. "The First amendment protects the right of 'expressive association'-that is, 'the
right to associate for the purpose of speaking."' Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3010 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
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discriminating on the basis of religion while permitting religious clubs
to discriminate against those who do not hold religious beliefs.
Basically, we think that in this section of its brief, CLS wants to
have its cake and eat it too. CLS argued that it is viewpoint
discrimination to prohibit religious organizations from discriminating
on the basis of religious belief while permitting secular political
organizations to discriminate on the basis of nonreligious belief. But
it is not viewpoint discrimination to prohibit secular political
organizations from discriminating on the basis of religious belief
while permitting religious organizations to discriminate on the basis
of secular beliefs. Religious student organizations receive more
associational autonomy than their secular counterparts and religious
students receive more protection for their beliefs than students who
hold secular beliefs. Unfortunately for CLS, that is not the way free
speech doctrine works. The prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination is, and has to be, fiercely even-handed. If religion is
going to be construed as a viewpoint of speech in freedom of
association cases, it is difficult to see how anti-discrimination policies
can treat religion differently than secular belief systems or religious
groups differently than those that adhere to secular beliefs. To
conform to viewpoint neutrality, government would have to prohibit
discrimination based on both religious and secular beliefs or decline
to prohibit discrimination based on either belief system.
Justice Alito attempted to escape this implication of the CLS
viewpoint-discrimination argument in his dissenting opinion. He
argued that allowing religious groups to discriminate against
prospective members who do not share the group's beliefs would not
undercut prohibitions against religious discrimination in other
circumstances. 94  Freedom of expressive association would only
protect a group's membership decisions against state anti-
discrimination regulations if admitting the excluded persons would
significantly impact the group's ability to express its message."
Because of that limitation to associational freedom, fraternities and
sororities would still have to abide by state regulations prohibiting
religious discrimination, as would groups dedicated to secular,
political or ideological goals. In both circumstances, Justice Alito
argued, admitting religious individuals to the group would not impair
its ability to carry out its expressive functions.
94. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3012 (Alito, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
This argument is disingenuous at best. In Dale, the Court took
an extraordinarily deferential approach to its evaluation of expressive
association claims." Put simply, under the analysis the Court
employed in Dale, any association that is engaged in expressive
conduct of any kind will be recognized as expressive for constitutional
purposes even if many of its activities are non-expressive in nature."
The goal of disseminating a particular message need not have
anything to do with the association's purpose or the reason why
people join it.9" Further, the association's explanation of its
expressive mission will be accepted without review and regardless of
whether there is evidence to support its claims as to the content of its
message." Finally, the association's message can be communicated
through its conduct as well as through conventional means of
expression. Thus, in Dale, the Boy Scouts communicated their anti-
gay message in part by their decision to exclude gays from the
association."
96. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
97. Id. In Dale, the Court explained that "the First Amendment's protection of
expressive association is not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come within its ambit, a
group must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private." Id. at
648. It is difficult to imagine any group not fitting within such an expansive definition.
Later, the Court noted that any group seeking to transmit values is engaged in expressive
activity even if it is doing so through conduct such camping trips or survival training. Id. at
650.
98. Id. at 655. The Court stated that "associations do not have to associate for the
'purpose' of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of
the First Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive activity that could
be impaired in order to be entitled to protection." Id.
99. In determining the Boy Scouts' position on homosexuality, the Court noted that
the Boy Scouts asserted in their brief to the Court that the Scouts teach that
homosexuality is not morally straight and should not be promoted as a legitimate form of
behavior. Without further analysis, the Court stated: "We accept the Boy Scouts'
assertion. We need not inquire further to determine the nature of the Boy Scouts'
expression with regard to homosexuality." Id. at 651.
100. In discussing whether the presence of an openly gay assistant scout master "would
significantly burden" the Scouts' anti-homosexual message, the Court insisted that it was
not suggesting that "an expressive association can erect a shield against antidiscrimination
laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular group would
impair its message." Id. at 653. The Court's subsequent analysis, however, comes
perilously close to holding that the exclusion of members of a particular group by an
association constitutes a protected message that would be impaired by allowing the
group's members to join the association. The Court notes that it will "give deference to an
association's view of what would impair its expression." Id. at 653. It also maintains that
an association may communicate its message "by example"-that is, by its leaders not
being members of the excluded group. Id. at 655. Finally, an association can choose to
communicate its anti-homosexual message by refusing to allow openly gay men to be
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With Dale as precedent, all of Justice Alito's arguments fall
apart. A fraternity or sorority need only assert that it is trying to
instill or promote the ideals of Christian fellowship or Judeo-
Christian sisterhood or any other religious value to receive
constitutional protection for its exclusionary membership policies.
Once the fraternity's or sorority's expressive goal is accepted, as it
almost has to be after Dale, it is only a short step to argue that its
message would be impaired if it were required to admit students of a
particular faith or no faith. Under the authority of Dale, the fact that
the fraternity or sorority holds an annual Christmas and Easter party
would probably be enough to allow it to discriminate against Muslims
and Jews.
The argument is even easier for an ideological association. An
association's decision to exclude religious individuals or members of a
particular faith need not be rational, persuasive, or internally
consistent." Thus, the association need only insist that it stands for
the proposition that the actions or beliefs of a particular religious
faith are inconsistent with the association's values and goals. After
Dale, it would not be appropriate or relevant for Justice Alito-or
any other Justice, judge, or court-to determine whether an
association's asserted expressive goals actually reflect the values it
instills or promotes in its ongoing activities. When associations have
open-ended discretion to define their expressive mission during
litigation, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a court to conclude
that the association's membership policies are not logically or
reasonably relevant to the group's ability to express its message. Dale
effectively forecloses any attempt to substitute a court's conclusions
as to an association's membership policies and message for the
conclusions of the association itself.
Of course, a fraternity or ideological group may erroneously
attribute certain beliefs or conduct to the members of religious
community. A sorority or political club, for example, may mistakenly
generalize the attitudes of some members of a religion to all those
who profess a particular faith. However, freedom of speech and
association is not limited to the wise or knowledgeable. To take an
assistant scoutmasters even if it allows Scout leaders to publicly challenge the Scouts'
discriminatory policies. Id. at 655-56. If these three arguments are taken seriously, it is
difficult to imagine how forcing a group to accept unwanted members could be found not
to impair the group's message.
101. In Dale, the Court states that an association's expressive values must be protected
even if the court finds them to be irrational or internally inconsistent. Id. at 651.
easy example, a group supporting same-sex marriage might refuse to
admit Mormons to its association on the grounds that they believe the
Mormon Church strongly supported Proposition 8 in California and
opposed legal recognition of same-sex marriages." The fact that
some Mormons opposed Proposition 8 would be irrelevant to the
constitutional analysis. The group supporting same-sex marriage
would be free to believe that members of the church are morally
tainted by the views of the church hierarchy and cannot be trusted to
work for gay and lesbian rights. After Dale, it is hard to imagine why
such an association's policy excluding Mormons as members would
not be constitutionally protected.
One cannot escape this analysis by emphasizing the relative
magnitude of the burden on associational freedom experienced by
religious and secular groups resulting from anti-discrimination
policies. Attempting to do so would inappropriately mix an
association's liberty interest in being free from state interference with
its membership decisions and its equality interest in being treated no
differently than other expressive associations because of its
viewpoint. Even modest interference with associational freedom that
does not significantly impact a group's ability to express its message
will be unconstitutional if it is imposed only on groups that express a
particular viewpoint. From a liberty perspective, Justice Alito may be
correct that a prohibition against religious discrimination may be
substantially more burdensome to many religious organizations that it
would be to many secular organizations. But for speech equality
purposes, if we are going to insist that religion is a viewpoint of
expression in evaluating anti-discrimination policies, then regulations
that distinguish between religious and nonreligious associations with
regard to their membership criteria must be subject to rigorous
scrutiny. A policy that prohibits secular organizations from
discriminating on the basis of religion while permitting religious
organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion is viewpoint
discriminatory on its face, and as such, it must be justified under strict
scrutiny review. Such a policy would also be viewpoint discriminatory
as applied. It is hard to explain how a regulation that permits
religious student associations to exclude same-sex married couples as
members (because the couples' beliefs and conduct conflict with
102. California and Same-Sex Marriage, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-
DAY SAINTS (June 30, 2008), http://beta-newsroom.1ds.org/article/california-and-same-
sex-marriage; see also COALITION FOR MARRIAGE AND FAMILY, http://www.coalition
formarriage.org/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
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religious commitments), but prohibits gay rights organizations from
excluding students whose religion rejects same-sex relationships as an
abomination, could be characterized, to use Justice Alito's words, as
"anything other than viewpoint discrimination."'03
Justice Alito's attempt to limit the consequences of his argument
for all laws and policies prohibiting religious discrimination is not
only unavailing and unpersuasive, but also fails to recognize the full
extent of the danger to religious liberty that his analysis creates. If
prohibitions against religious discrimination are going to be
rigorously evaluated under the free speech framework invalidating
viewpoint discrimination, the future of such prohibitions may be very
bleak indeed. After all, if religion is first and foremost a viewpoint of
speech, it is difficult to explain why any anti-discrimination law that
protects individuals (and groups) espousing religious beliefs more
vigorously than it protects individuals (and groups) who espouse
secular beliefs is not itself presumptively invalid viewpoint
discrimination.
In order to fully appreciate the seriousness of this problem, it
may be helpful to consider Title VII's prohibition against religious
discrimination in hiring. Under current law, this anti-
discrimination requirement has been amended so that it does not
apply to any employment decision by nonprofit religious
organizations."os This amendment was upheld against an
establishment clause challenge in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos'" in 1987.
Suppose, however, Congress was to repeal this religious
accommodation. Then, all religious organizations would be
prohibited from taking religious belief into account in making their
employment decisions. It is easy to imagine and explain a Free
Exercise, Establishment Clause, or Freedom of Association claim
being brought to challenge this requirement1 O Indeed, it seems
103. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3012 (Alito, J., dissenting).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2006).
106. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
107. See generally McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (Free
Exercise); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F. 2d 1164 (4th
Cir. 1985) (Establishment Clause); MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY, AND &
THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 308 (2006).
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absurd to suggest that federal law could prohibit a church from
discriminating on the basis of religion in hiring clergy or other
employees that perform religious functions.
Under the position argued by CLS in Martinez and adopted by
Justice Alito, however, a law like Title VII without a religious
accommodation provision could also be successfully challenged on
the grounds that it discriminated on the basis of viewpoint in violation
of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Religious
discrimination is prohibited by the statute, but political discrimination
is not. Thus, Title VII would prohibit religious organizations from
discriminating on the basis of religion, but would not prohibit political
organizations from discriminating on the basis of political beliefs. To
the Martinez dissenters, that is viewpoint discrimination. If they are
correct, every anti-discrimination statute that prohibits religious
discrimination, but not political discrimination, is in peril of being
challenged as prohibited viewpoint discrimination.
This argument is without precedent. Certainly, the Court never
intimated in the Amos decision that the Title VII amendment it
upheld might be necessary to avoid a claim of viewpoint
discrimination. Moreover, it is clear that Title VII on its face would
not be treating religious organizations differently than nonreligious
organizations. All organizations would be prohibited from
discriminating on the basis of religion in hiring staff. The argument
would have to be that the incidental effect of a law protecting
religious individuals from discrimination in hiring burdens the speech
and association rights of religious organizations far more than it
burdens their secular counterparts. Looking beyond the facial
neutrality of a law in order to classify it as viewpoint discriminatory
because of its effects is a significant extension of free speech doctrine.
But that is not the only problem with this analysis. Title VII is
not really facially neutral with regard to viewpoints of speech. On its
face, Title VII provides important protection against employment
discrimination to individuals who believe and espouse religious
beliefs, but provides no comparable protection to individuals who
believe and espouse secular beliefs (that, after all, is precisely what a
prohibition against religious discrimination mandates). As noted
earlier, however, if religion is going to be generally construed as a
viewpoint of speech, this formal difference in treatment would seem
to be a fairly glaring example of viewpoint discrimination. Indeed,
this argument may be unavoidable if the CLS/Justice Alito position
on viewpoint discrimination is accepted. It cannot be that the
incidental impact of a Title VII-type ban on religious discrimination
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in hiring would be held to constitute viewpoint discrimination against
religious organizations, but the facially explicit protection provided
only to religious individuals would not be found to constitute
viewpoint discrimination against individuals holding secular beliefs.
Ultimately, both CLS's and Justice Alito's arguments about
viewpoint discrimination suffer from the same defect. They attempt
to extend the Court's access to public forum decisions holding that
discrimination against religious activities constitutes viewpoint
discrimination" when, in fact, these cases already reach too far and
have a problematic foundation. In our judgment, the Supreme Court
has moved a long way down a treacherous path by continually
equating discrimination against expressive religious activities as
viewpoint discrimination prohibited by the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment, rather than reviewing these issues under the
religion clauses of the First Amendment.1 9
The Court seems oblivious to the fact that from a free speech
perspective there is no basis for treating religious beliefs, expression,
or expressive assemblies and associations as unique and distinctive or
deserving of any special constitutional respect or recognition.
Continued adherence to this viewpoint-discrimination approach will
increasingly render discretionary religious accommodations subject to
challenge under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. At
the end, it may even support the conclusion-already portended by
the CLS and Justice Alito arguments in Martinez-that prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of religion is intrinsically viewpoint
discriminatory and unconstitutional as well. Fortunately, the Court
did not take that step in Martinez. Religious groups, such as CLS,
and Supreme Court Justices like Alito who support religious liberty,
should think more than twice about the wisdom of continuing down
this ill-fated doctrinal path.
108. Justice Alito emphasized that his argument about viewpoint discrimination is
predicated on this line of authority. He writes, "In an unbroken line of decisions analyzing
private religious speech in limited public forums, we have made it perfectly clear that
'[r]eligion is [a] viewpoint from which ideas are conveyed."' Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3009
(Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 553 U.S. 98, 112 &
n. 4 (2001)).
109. See generally, Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs
of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119 (2002); Alan
Brownstein, Why Conservatives, and Others, Have Trouble Supporting the Meaningful
Enforcement of Free Exercise Rights, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 925 (2010).
Conclusion
We believe that CLS raised important constitutional questions in
the Martinez case. However, we have serious misgivings about the
arguments CLS provided to answer these questions. We agree with
CLS that the Hastings policy imposes serious burdens on
associational freedom. If that policy is constitutional, it is because
neither speech nor association receives substantial protection in a
limited public forum. But our sympathy with CLS on this issue is not
limited to religious groups. It also extends to other nonreligious
speakers and associations whose access to public property for
expressive or associational purposes can be restricted without serious
review under the Court's current forum analysis.
Because prior Supreme Court cases so frequently concluded that
the exclusion of religious groups from nonpublic or limited public
forums constituted viewpoint discrimination, which is subject to strict
scrutiny review,no religious organizations and speakers have not
experienced the full brunt of the Court's decisions in this area. While
restrictions on the access of secular speakers received lenient review
and were often upheld, the exclusion of religious expressive activities
was rigorously reviewed and struck down. The Martinez decision is
notable because it provides the same very limited protection to
religious speakers that secular speakers have received for the last two
decades. Now, for the first time, religious and nonreligious speakers
are in the same leniently protected expressive boat.
Perhaps as a result of Martinez, it is time for religious groups
take up the fight that they have previously been able to avoid. The
appropriate doctrinal response to Martinez may be to call for
increasing the rigor of review applied to both content-discriminatory
speech regulations and debate dampening constraints on associational
freedom that determine the parameters of a limited public forum.
That change in doctrine would benefit speakers and associations
across the board, not just those promoting religious beliefs.
We also have some sympathy for the argument suggested by CLS
and the dissenting Justices in Martinez that there are some
circumstances in which religious individuals and organizations should
receive additional protection against discrimination than is provided
to their secular counterparts. We believe it is a mistake, however, to
110. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lambs Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
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attempt to manipulate free speech doctrine to achieve that result.
Attempts to force religious discrimination issues into the free speech
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination are internally
contradictory. They attempt to protect the distinctive nature of
religious expressive activities by arguing that religious association,
speech, and belief are no different than secular association, speech
and belief.
The incoherence of the CLS and dissenting Justices' viewpoint-
discrimination arguments does not mean that there is no
constitutional basis for providing religion the constitutional
protection it requires and deserves. Free speech doctrine is simply
the wrong place to seek a constitutional shield for religious autonomy
and practice. The proper constitutional location for arguments
grounded on the distinctive nature of religion is the Free Exercise or
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."' It is long past the
time when courts and proponents of religious freedom should cast
aside their reliance on free speech doctrine and recognize that reality.
111. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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